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Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of
academic-and sometimes, political-debate in the United States. State
corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States,
determines most questions of internal corporate governance-the role of
boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors,
managers and shareholders, etc.-while federal law governs questions of
disclosure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and
periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most
recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,1 this dividing line between
state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most
immediate impact on corporate governance outcomes.
Companies have a good deal of discretion in choosing their state of
incorporation. The allocation to the states of primary authority over
corporate governance, when combined with the "internal affairs"
doctrine (which holds that courts must apply the law of the state of
incorporation to corporate law disputes), has created an "issuer choice"
regime in state corporate law.2 Corporations are free to choose the law
of the state that best suits the needs of their directors, managers, and
shareholders, without regard to where the corporation principally does
business. States can compete to attract firms by offering the most
attractive menu of corporate law rules. Competition for corporate
charters is not just about state pride: States that attract incorporations are
rewarded with tangible benefits in the form of charter fees. Of equal
importance, incorporations are also likely to produce work for lawyers
in the state, who may be an influential lobbying force.
3
Critics of issuer choice argue that states compete by pandering to
corporate managers. These critics charge that states are caught in a
* Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
2. On the history of the internal affairs doctrine, see Frederick Tung, Before Competition:
Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33 (2006).
3. Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World's Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1131 (2005).
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"race to the bottom," catering to management by providing rules that
promote management entrenchment at the expense of shareholders.4
According to this view, states prevail in this competition by leaving
shareholders vulnerable to overreaching by corporate managers. These
critics point to state antitakeover laws as evidence for their position.
5
Advocates for state control over corporate governance respond that
competition between states for corporate charters generates a "race to
the top." According to this camp, competition in the capital markets
compels managers to offer shareholders corporate law rules that
effectively constrain the agency costs inherent in the separation of
ownership and control.6
Whether the race is to the top or the bottom, Delaware has prevailed
in the competition for corporate charters. That state draws a substantial
majority of the nation's largest public companies to incorporate under its
corporate code, despite its relatively small population and share of the
national economy.
Lately, the topic of jurisdictional competition has spread from
corporate law to its close cousin, securities law. Historically, issuers
listed their stock for trading on one of the exchanges in the country
where they principally did business. Improvements in communication
and related technologies, however, have made possible an international
market for stock exchange listings that resembles, in many respects, the
long-standing federal market for corporate charters in the United States.
In an era when businesses are consolidating across national boundaries
to create international conglomerates, the notion of a corporation having
a "home" country seems increasingly archaic. Corporations, at least
those of a certain size, are now citizens of the world, although they may
identify with the jurisdiction where their headquarters are located.
Today, corporations around the world realistically can choose the
location, or locations, where they want to raise capital. They can also
choose where they want their common shares to trade. Corporations are
not limited to their "home" country in making these critical business
decisions, and the capital-raising decision need not be linked to the
listing decision.
Academics have offered their views on the normative desirability of
4. William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REv. 111 (2001).
6. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
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issuer choice in the worldwide market for listings for close to a decade.7
More recently, groups more intimately involved in live policy disputes
have entered the fray. The last few years-not coincidentally following
closely the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act-have seen a flurry of
reports bemoaning the decline of American competitiveness in the
market for international listings.8
As of today, the primary contenders in that listing market are New
York and London. These cities have long dominated the competition for
international listings, with New York the historic leader. Not
coincidentally, those two markets have also long been the deepest and
most liquid-and liquidity attracts listings. The source of that liquidity
is hotly contested, and the competition for listings between the United
States and the United Kingdom raises important and interesting policy
questions. In this essay, I want to put aside those normative topics.
Instead, I want to focus on prediction-can we pick a winner in this
market? Is London or New York likely to prevail in the battle for
corporate listings?
This international question can be explored through the historical lens
of domestic competition for corporate charters. In this essay, my central
claim is that Delaware has prevailed in that competition by being highly
attuned to demands by directors who choose the site of incorporation.
That responsiveness is driven, in part, by its small population and
relatively insignificant share of the U.S. economy. Delaware has very
few public companies, which limits the number of managers and
shareholders who might seek to influence the direction of its corporate
law. Translating this insight to the market for exchange listings, London
is the smaller, and therefore potentially more nimble, of the two primary
international contenders. Should we expect the David of London to
prevail over the Goliath of Gotham?
I proceed as follows. I begin in Part II by exploring how Delaware
has prevailed in the U.S. market for corporate charters. Part III then
looks at the development of the international market for corporate
7. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors, A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Merritt B.
Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85
VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1200 (1999).
8. See, e.g, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/1 1.30ComniitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf; MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG
& CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
LEADERSHIP (2007); COMM'N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007).
2009] 475
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listings and compares the strengths and weaknesses of London and New
York in that competition. In Part IV, I assess whether London shares
Delaware's advantages in jurisdictional competition. Is London likely to
prevail in the market for listings? My answer, ultimately, is no. In the
long term, New York is likely to lose in the market for listings, but so is
London. I offer concluding speculations about the effect of democracy
on the market for listings in Part V.
II. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION: THE DELAWARE ADVANTAGE
A. Statutes
Does Delaware corporate law differ from that of other states in a way
that is likely to appeal to directors choosing a state of incorporation?9
Recent work suggests that the competition for corporate charters is
largely bilateral: States compete with Delaware to retain corporate
charters.10 Notably, Delaware does not compete on price. Delaware's
incorporation fees are generally higher than those charged by other
states, and incorporating in Delaware does not produce any particular
tax advantages. If we look at the substance of the law, what is on offer
in Delaware? The differences between the Delaware General
Corporation Law and its main competitor, the Model Business
Corporation Act (adopted in more than forty states) are slight, so
doctrinal analysis yields few obvious clues.11 Notably, egregious forms
9. Different corporate laws may be better or worse for different corporate constituencies. In
particular, restrictions on payouts to shareholders may appeal to creditors, potentially decreasing a
firm's cost of debt. Wald and Long found that firms incorporated in states with tighter payout
constraints, including California and New York, carry lower levels of debt than firms incorporated in
Delaware, which does not impose a fixed payout constraint. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 500 (West
2009), and N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510 (McKinney 2009), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2010).
See also John K. Wald & Michael S. Long, The Effect of State Laws on Capital Structure, 83 J. FIN.
ECON. 297 (2007). Sattar A. Mansi, William F. Maxwell and John K. Wald find that firms from states
that restrict payouts have better credit ratings and lower yield spreads. They also found antitakeover
statutes reduce the cost of debt for investment-grade firms. Sattar A. Mansi et al., Do State Laws Matter
for Bondholders? (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.mbs.ac.uk/
Research/accountingfinance/documents/Mansi-Maxwell-Wald.pdf.
10. See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice:
Evidence on the "Race " Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1795 (2002).
11. Romano found that firms are likely to reincorporate in Delaware before committing to a
program of mergers and acquisitions. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). Delaware, with its doctrine of "independent
legal significance," gives corporations flexibility in structuring transactions and will not import
procedures applicable to one type of transaction into another type. See Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 150 A.2d 755 (Del. 1959) (rejecting "de facto merger" claim). This doctrine takes on practical
importance in allowing acquiring corporations to avoid shareholder votes and appraisal rights in most
circumstances. Delaware corporations can set up a holding company structure without a shareholder
HeinOnline  -- 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 476 2009-2010
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of self-dealing, such as looting and tunneling, are proscribed by all
states, although procedures for enforcing those proscriptions may vary.
So U.S. corporate law is intolerant of kleptocracy that discourages
outside investment in many developing nations.
With explicit self-dealing prohibited in all U.S. jurisdictions, some
scholars have focused on managers' quest for self-preservation.
Antitakeover provisions are thought to promote management
entrenchment; perhaps these provisions drive the competition for
charters? 12  Do antitakeover provisions explain Delaware's dominance
in the competition for corporate charters? Although Delaware's
antitakeover statute is generally considered less protective of
management than most states, these differences may have little practical
effect. Delaware courts have validated the use of the poison pill to ward
off takeovers, so managers of Delaware corporations are relatively
immune to external threat. And firms at the initial public offering (IPO)
stage can make this defense effectively invulnerable by adopting a
staggered board, even in relatively takeover-friendly Delaware.13
Despite managers' ability to construct their own antitakeover
defenses, Guhan Subramanian found that firms are more likely to
incorporate in the state where their headquarters are located if that state
vote, DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 2 51(g) (2010), which allows Delaware corporations to complete
acquisitions through a triangular merger using a subsidiary without triggering a shareholder vote or
appraisal.
12. Although intuitively plausible, the evidence for this proposition turns out to be rather thin.
See Murali Jagannathan & A.C. Pritchard, Does Delaware Entrench Management? (Univ. of Mich.,
Working Paper No. 93, 2009) (finding that companies incorporated in states with stringent antitakeover
protection do not have a lower rate of management turnover).
13. A substantial portion of the preference for antitakeover provisions found by Subramanian,
see supra note 10, may be explained by the exodus from California. California does not provide any
explicit antitakeover statutes, although its corporate code does make it very difficult to cash out minority
shareholders, CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101(e) (West 2009), which may provide some secondary
antitakeover effect. Unlike most antitakeover provisions, however, this provision is not subject to
waiver by the target company's board. Avoiding this provision may push firms headquartered in
California to incorporate in Delaware. California also stands out in that the validity of the poison pill
has not yet been established there; the pill may run afoul of that state's provision precluding
discrimination among shareholders. Id. § 203. In Delaware, by contrast, the validity of the pill is firmly
established, although there are limits on the type of pill that can be adopted.
If the quest for antitakeover protection were the primary motivation for fleeing California,
however, Delaware seems an unlikely destination: the neighboring state of Nevada not only has a
statutory language validating poison pills, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.195(5), 87.350(4), & 78.378(3)
(2008), but also gives directors greater discretion in redeeming pills than Delaware. Id. § 78.139.
Moreover, Nevada not only has a business combination statute, id. § 78.438, with fewer exceptions than
Delaware's, DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 8, § 203 (2010), but unlike Delaware, it has a control share statute.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.379. In addition to Nevada's relatively stringent antitakeover protections, it is
also cheaper than Delaware, both in terms of franchise fees, and in terms of potential litigation costs.
Taking all of these factors together, it seems unlikely that California firms choose Delaware
incorporation for antitakeover reasons.
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has adopted antitakeover statutes.14  Rob Daines, however, argues that
Delaware's relatively mild antitakeover statute may minimize
management entrenchment. He showed that takeover activity is not
lower in Delaware. 15  These findings suggest that firms may sort
themselves based on their willingness to be taken over. Particularly for
firms incorporated in states with stringent antitakeover protection,
incorporating in Delaware may be akin to putting a "For Sale" sign on
the door of the company's headquarters. This sorting hypothesis may be
undermined, however, by Marcel Kahan, who, after controlling for other
factors that might influence choice of incorporation, found no evidence
that firms are likely to incorporate in states with antitakeover statutes. 16
But these scholars may be looking under the wrong lamppost to
explain Delaware's advantage in the competition for charters. Delaware
dominated the market for charters long before the advent of antitakeover
provisions. Gordon Moodie showed that Delaware reincorporations
surge after Delaware adopts liability protections for directors. 17  To be
sure, under the corporate law of virtually every state, the combination of
the business judgment rule, stringent demand requirements, and broad
statutory exculpation provisions means that directors face vanishingly
small probabilities that they will be held personally liable for their acts
as directors. 18
Even if the probability of liability is low, however, directors may take
a special interest in provisions protecting them from personal liability if
the states' corporate law does not differ much on other margins.
Liability concerns are likely to be salient for outside directors, who have
limited ability to control the firm's litigation exposure because they do
14. Subramanian, supra note 10. Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen report a similar finding.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where To Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383
(2003).
15. Robert Daires, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001).
16. Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or
Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340 (2006).
17. Gordon Moodie, Forty Years of Charter Competition: A Race To Protect Directors from
Liability? (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin-center/fellows .papers/pdf/Moodie 1.pdf (discussion paper). Heron and Lewellen found
positive abnormal stock returns for firms reincorporating for the purpose of obtaining liability
protections for directors, suggesting that shareholders are cognizant of the role of such protections in
attracting quality outside directors. Randall A. Heron & Wilbur G. Lewellen, An Empirical Analysis of
the Reincorporation Decision, 33 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 549 (1998).
18. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006).
Delaware law does not differ significantly from the Model Business Corporation Act (M.B.C.A.) on the
question of the standard of care or the protections of the business judgment rule. The M.B.C.A. also
tracks Delaware law closely on the question of liability exculpation for breaches of the duty of care; if
anything, the M.B.C.A. may be slightly more generous to directors. Compare MODEL BuS. CORP. ACT
§ 2.02(b) (2002), with DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).
478
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not make day-to-day business decisions. Among outside directors,
directors who serve multiple firms are most likely to be concerned about
the potential for personal liability because each additional board
membership increases the threat of liability. 19 And directors, after all,
make the decision where to incorporate. The lawyers who advise those
directors are also likely to focus on liability concerns, and lawyers are
the most common instigators of reincorporation decisions. 20  Consistent
with this line of reasoning, Kahan found that states that have not adopted
a liability limitation are significantly less likely to retain firms
headquartered in their states.2'
B. Judges
Beyond differences in exculpation and indemnification, Delaware
may promise directors more subtle advantages. Kahan found that firms
are more likely to incorporate in states with high-quality judicial systems
and flexible corporate law rules-two characteristics for which
Delaware is well known.22  Commentators suggest Delaware's
experienced and expert judges who sit on its Court of Chancery may
play an important role in protecting shareholder interests.23 That role is
necessarily muted, however, by the very low probability that a director
will be held personally liable. The low probability of liability suggests
that experienced and expert judges are not important because they are
likely to intervene to protect shareholder interests, thereby inducing
Delaware board members to act as faithful monitors. Instead, an
alternative causal story would suggest quality judges are important
because they are likely to give directors comfort that they will not face
liability because the judges render litigation outcomes that predictably
19. Delaware law is particularly generous on indemnification. Delaware directors who prevail in
a lawsuit against them have a statutory guarantee of indemnity from the corporation for the expense of
their defense, which may be considerable. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(c)). States following the
Model Business Corporations Act also provide for guaranteed indemnification, but that provision
requires complete exoneration, MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.52, whereas Delaware requires
indemnification for partial success. See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974). Delaware may also be more generous in allowing companies to provide permissive
indemnification. Compare DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 8, § 145(f), with MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.56.
These differences are muted, however, by insurance policies, which are universal, and go beyond
indemnification in the range of conduct that can be covered.
20. See Romano, supra note 11, at 273.
21. Kahan, supra note 16, at 353.
22. Id. at 363; see also Romano, supra note 11, at 280.
23. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CN. L. REv. 1061, 1063 (2000).
2009] 479
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shield directors.
24
To be sure, Delaware law could afford directors total security by
granting them complete immunity; Delaware has not gone down that
path. Instead, it simply guarantees that when litigation is brought, the
directors will not be held personally liable. 25  The predictability of
Delaware law is further bolstered by the large stock of precedent that
guides its courts. Delaware's combination of expert judges and
relatively comprehensive precedent provides a predictable body of law,
at least on the salient point of the potential for director liability.
Notwithstanding the slim chance that a director will be found liable,
the experience and expertise of Delaware judges may allow them to play
an important "shaming" role, publicly rebuking outside directors for
inattention to their duties, even while excusing them from liability.
26
The Delaware Supreme Court's recent Disney decision is a prominent
example of this style of decisionmaking. 27 Delaware judges' impact is
likely to be amplified by the attention given to their decisions by the
media and legal academics. Directors may be signaling their quality by
pushing their firms to incorporate in Delaware, thereby announcing a
willingness to have at least their reputation be held publicly accountable
to shareholders through litigation.2 8  That willingness is undoubtedly
bolstered, however, by the knowledge that they will not personally bear
the consequences of suit. The company's directors and officer's
insurance policy will cover the costs of suit, and that policy will pay any
settlement. The directors will not pay out of pocket. Their houses and
retirement funds are safe.
The Citigroup decision is a timely exemplar of the predictability of
the Delaware judiciary. 9 In that case, the plaintiff shareholders
attempted to hold Citigroup directors liable in a derivative action for
failure to monitor the bank's risk taking in subprime mortgage market.
Chancellor Chandler framed the theory of liability as a Caremark claim,
i.e., a failure by the board to monitor management's operation of the
firm.30 The court placed an "extremely high burden" on the plaintiff to
show that the directors had acted in "bad faith," which it defined as
24. See Romano, supra note 11.
25. See Macey, supra note 3, at 1132.
26. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1103-05 (1997).
27. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
28. See Edward M. Iacobucci, Toward a Signaling Explanation of the Private Choice of
Corporate Law, 6 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 319 (2004).
29. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
30. Id. at 121-22 (citing In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996)).
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"particularized facts that show that a director consciously disregarded an
obligation to be reasonably informed about the business and its risks or
consciously disregarded the duty to monitor and oversee the business. ' 31
The rationale for this daunting standard was a familiar one: the need to
preserve the board's ability to exercise its discretion.
Business decision-makers must operate in the real world, with imperfect
information, limited resources, and an uncertain future. To impose
liability on directors for making a "wrong" business decision would
cripple their ability to earn returns for investors by taking business risks.
Indeed, this kind of judicial second guessing is what the business
judgment rule was designed to prevent, and even if a complaint is framed
under a Caremark theory, this Court will not abandon such bedrock
principles of Delaware fiduciary duty law. 32
In a nutshell, the "bedrock principle" is that Delaware courts will not
second-guess directors. 33  And so that principle was applied in
Citigroup, with the Chancellor rejecting the plaintiffs' claims.
C. The Legislature
The Delaware legislature does its part to reassure outside directors as
well. Delaware's constitution requires a two-thirds vote of the
legislature to amend the corporate law. 34  The legislature further
enhances predictability with virtually complete reliance on the corporate
bar to screen any amendments proposed for the corporate code. 35 The
combination of these structural features means that Delaware's
politicians have largely tied their hands when it comes to the corporate
code. Partisan politics does not entangle corporate lawmaking.
36
Consequently, interest groups and corporate "reformers"-who have
their own agenda-face substantial barriers when seeking changes in
Delaware's corporate law.
More importantly, the state has bonded a good deal of its tax revenue
31. Id. at 125.
32. Id. at 126.
33. Id. ("It is almost impossible for a court, in hindsight, to determine whether the directors of a
company properly evaluated risk and thus made the 'right' business decision.").
34. DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Indeed, the custom is for changes to be approved unanimously.
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1749, 1753 (2006).
35. See Hamermesh, supra note 34, at 1754-57 (describing the operation of the Council of the
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association that is responsible for proposing
amendments to the Delaware corporate law).
36. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 885, 898 (1990).
2009]
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stream as a guarantee that it will not do anything reckless in the field of
corporate governance. Some scholars suggest Delaware's competitive
advantage is tied, in part, to its small population, which ensures that
franchise tax revenues will be a significant portion of its overall
budget. 37 That budget contribution amounted to 15% of revenues in
2007.38 The crisis du jour will inevitably be met with calls for populist
retribution--e.g., Congress's incursion into corporate governance with
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act39-but the constituents of Delaware legislators
are unlikely to lead the call. Consequently, Delaware legislators are
relatively insulated from the populist backlash that inevitably
accompanies economic downturns. Insulating corporate lawmaking
from the vagaries of democracy may be Delaware's most important
comparative advantage.
Not only does Delaware's legislature protect directors from the tides
of democracy, it also protects them from the unlikely event of judicial
overreaching. Delaware's reliance on charter fee revenues is a powerful
incentive for legislative attentiveness to corporate law. Consequently,
should Delaware's judges slip and do the unpredictable, directors of
Delaware firms can be confident that the Delaware legislature will step
in to correct the problem. When the Delaware Supreme Court did the
unthinkable in Smith v. Van Gorkom4 0-holding the directors of Trans
Union personally liable for the careless sale of their company-the
Delaware legislature quickly restored equilibrium by allowing
corporations to amend their charters to eliminate money damages for
duty of care violations. 41 The Delaware legislature's swift overturning
of Smith v. Van Gorkom actually accelerated Delaware
reincorporations.42 Delaware created a shock to the system, and then
benefited from the ensuing uncertainty in the directors' and officers'
insurance market by fixing the problem more swiftly than its peer states.
D. Summing up Delaware 's Comparative Advantage
Predictability for directors is the theme that unites these points.43
37. See Romano, supra note 11, at 241.
38. See STATE OF DELAWARE, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 9 (2007),
available at http://accounting.delaware.gov/2007cafr.pdf.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 60-68.
40. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
41. DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).
42. See Moodie, supra note 17, at 41-42.
43. Hamermesh, supra note 34, at 1774 ("In predicting the trajectory of future struggle between
federal and state governments over the establishment of corporate governance rules, count on Delaware
to look for ways to make changes, if at all, that most nearly preserve intact the substance and balance
482
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Delaware provides a relatively certain body of law that gives confidence
to lawyers called on to advise their clients. Delaware's predictability
gives comfort to outside directors, who can sleep well at night if they
serve on the board of Delaware corporations, regardless of the diligence
of their monitoring. Corporate governance failures will inevitably be
met with calls for draconian reform, and most worrisomely, imposing
liability on the directors who were supposed to be minding the store.
Directors of Delaware firms can be confident that those calls will be
ignored. As Citigroup demonstrates, even amidst one of the worst
financial crises of the century, Delaware directors can rest easy knowing
that they will not be held personally liable for the fallout.
III. LONDON AND NEW YORK
London was the preeminent center of finance in the nineteenth
century, leveraging its longtime status as a trading center.4  The
historical advantage from international contacts was bolstered by the
new wealth created in Great Britain by the early rise of the Industrial
Revolution there. The combinations of these factors meant that London
enjoyed global ties and a deep source of capital, which it used to finance
development around the world. Most conspicuously, London capital
markets largely funded the expansion of the U.S. industrial economy.
Despite this head start, the cumulative impact of two world wars and the
burden imposed by the rapidly disintegrating British Empire wiped away
London's lead. By the end of the second of those two wars, New York
emerged as the world's preeminent financial center.
A. New York's Ascendance
It was not until the 1990s, however, that the world became small
enough to allow New York to translate its status as a financial center
into the ability to draw stock exchange listings from outside the United
States. During that decade, the New York Stock Exchange and the
Nasdaq established themselves as trading venues not only for U.S.
companies, but foreign companies as well.4 6 Drawn by the unmatched
depth and liquidity of the U.S. markets, foreign companies came to the
reflected in the existing law.").
44. CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 88 (1997).
45. See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARv. L. REV.
460 (2006).
46. Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing Its Competitive Edge? (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 192/2007, 2007).
2009]
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United States to add to the investment pool available in their home
jurisdiction. The U.S. exchanges, of course, had every incentive to be
accommodating; more listings meant more fees for the exchanges and
more commissions for their broker-dealers.
New York's status as the world's leading financial center made it the
preferred destination for companies choosing to cross-list on a stock
exchange away from their home jurisdiction. New York led this
competition through the 1990s, attracting 861 listings by foreign
companies during that decade.47 London trailed badly, garnering only
156 foreign listings during the same period.48 In 2000, nine of the ten
largest IPOs in the world took place in the United States; nearly half of
the money raised by non-U.S. companies in IPOs came from listing on a
U.S. exchange. 49 New York was riding high.
What did New York have to offer that London (and other
jurisdictions) lacked? Listing in New York offered a certain prestige,
making clear that a company was "world class.", More tangibly, New
York offered liquidity-New York boasted a deeper pool of investment
capital than London at that time. Listing in the United States also
provided valuable acquisition currency: common stock that could be
freely traded in the United States. For growing companies with
international aspirations looking to acquire publicly held U.S.
companies, having stock that could be used as merger consideration
offered considerable appeal. The alternative was cash-an international
currency that travels everywhere-but this would have required taking
on more debt or offering stock in their home jurisdiction.
A more controversial claim for the New York advantage is that New
York provided bonding; foreign companies could signal their integrity
by exposing themselves to the rigors of the U.S. disclosure and
enforcement regime. 50 That regime permitted foreign companies to
credibly precommit to limit self-dealing transactions. The mechanism
for precommitment was not a ban on such transaction, but disclosure
requirements under exacting U.S. standards, backed by the threat of SEC
scrutiny. The U.S. exchanges' computerized surveillance systems also
promised real teeth for enforcing insider trading rules and other
prohibitions against market manipulation. Other countries have
47. See Craig Doidge et a]., Has New York become less competitive than London in global
markets? Evaluating foreign listing choices over time, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 259, tbl. 2. (2009).
48. Id.
49. Eric J. Pan, Why the World No Longer Puts Its Stock in Us 2-3 (Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, Working Paper No. 176, 2006)
50. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr. Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757
(2002).
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followed the U.S. lead in prohibiting insider trading, but enforcement of
those prohibitions is either spotty or nonexistent. Of equal significance
for companies listing in the United States, misstatements about a
company's fortunes would be subject to the sting of SEC enforcement,
generally regarded as step above other jurisdictions, both in the
probability and size of sanctions.5'
In response to lobbying by the exchanges, the SEC did its part to
encourage foreign companies to list in the United States by relaxing a
number of potentially expensive requirements for listing in the United
States. Most notably, the agency (1) allowed foreign issuers to reconcile
their accounts with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, rather
than requiring a new set of financial statements prepared in accordance
with U.S. standards; 52 (2) relaxed certain reporting requirements; 53 and
(3) exempted foreign companies from the short-swing insider trading
rule of Section 16 and the proxy requirements.54 Conspicuously,
however, the SEC did not go so far as to allow foreign companies to
merely comply with the disclosure requirements of their home
jurisdictions (a "mutual recognition" regime). From the SEC's
perspective, U.S. standards were superior; they could be tinkered with
around the edges, but wholesale waiver was not an option. Although the
SEC was anxious to bring foreign companies to U.S. exchanges, it
recognized that it bore a "significant political risk" from financial
scandals involving foreign firms if American retail investors incurred
substantial losses.55 Stock market losses due to financial scandal make
the SEC unpopular; losses from fraud by foreigners are completely
unacceptable.
Perhaps this explains why the SEC did not exempt foreign companies
from the antifraud rules. Those antifraud rules carried the potential for
SEC enforcement. More unpredictably, selling securities in the United
States also exposed foreign issuers to Sections 11 and 12 of the
51. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
229, 238 n.17 (2007) (summarizing LSE's treatment of foreign issuers). The probability of SEC
enforcement against foreign issuers cross-listing in the United States was probably overstated. See
Jordan Siegel, Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting U.S. securities laws?, 75 J. FIN.
ECON. 319, 342 (2005) (finding that the SEC averaged two enforcement actions per year against cross-
listed firms).
52. See SEC Form F-I.
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13(b)(2) (2009) (exempting foreign issuers from quarterly reporting
requirements); Id. § 243.101(b) (exempting foreign issuers from Regulation FD's equal access to
disclosure requirements).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3.
55. Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors:
A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 31, 49 (2007).
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Securities Act, 56 which carry liability for misstatements made in
connection with public offerings, and Rule 1Ob-5 of the Exchange Act,
which makes companies potentially liable for misstatements, even when
they have not sold securities. 57  That liability risk, so frequently
bemoaned by U.S. companies as increasing their cost of raising capital,
made many foreign companies wary of dipping their toes into the U.S.
waters. Indeed, the risk of private litigation-unheard of in other
jurisdictions until very recently-was frequently cited by executives of
foreign companies as the most compelling reason for not listing in the
United States.58 Companies willing to face this risk by listing in the
United States sent a strong signal of honesty and integrity (or more
cynically, expected lack of volatility in their stock returns).
The twin burdens of SEC disclosure requirements and exposure to
securities class actions made listing in the United States a costly
proposition for foreign companies, notwithstanding the SEC's efforts at
accommodation. The fact that a significant number of companies were
willing to pay this price allowed the SEC to tell a happy story of a race
to the top in the competition for international listings. The best
companies sought to list in the United States because it had the best
regulation, the story went. Left unsaid was the inference that companies
that chose not to list in the United States had something to hide.
Evidence of a listing premium for companies selling shares in the United
States strongly supported the SEC's account. 9
B. The (British) Empire Strikes Back
This happy equilibrium for U.S competitiveness did not last. London
has overtaken-and by some measures, surpassed-New York. The
switch can be traced to 2001-2002, a period marked by two signal
developments for the U.S. financial markets. First, the tech bubble
collapsed, with the overheated Nasdaq market taking a precipitous dive.
The United States' thirst for "the next Microsoft" had seemingly abated
overnight, perhaps quenched by the collapse of Enron and WorldCom.
Second, and more tangibly, Congress reacted to the accounting scandals
at those companies by enacting a host of new regulatory requirements in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 60  Collecting a hodge-podge of reforms,
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k & 771(2006).
57. 17C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
58. BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 8, at 16.
59. See Craig Doidge et al., Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the US. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN.
EcON. 205 (2004).
60. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
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Congress (1) federalized a portion of corporate governance; 61 (2) took
over the regulation of accounting firms from the private sector;62 (3)
imposed expensive internal controls and certification requirements;
63
and (4) adopted an array of new sanctions.64 The most expensive of
these requirements were standards relating to internal accounting
controls, requiring both review and certifications of those controls by the
chief executive officer (CEO) and chief finanical officer 65  Foreign
company executives proved less than enthusiastic about the spotlight
afforded by those certifications. More importantly for the bottom line,
especially of smaller (i.e., growth) companies, Sarbanes-Oxley required
not only certification of those internal controls, but also auditor
attestation of their adequacy.66 Auditors proved unwilling to sign off on
internal controls that they had not reviewed-thoroughly-and audit
costs skyrocketed.67 Public companies were in no position to object to
the demands of their auditors; terminating an auditor had become
tantamount to an admission of fraud, so auditors now held the whip hand
in their relations with their client companies. And the language of
Sarbanes-Oxley offered no suggestion that the SEC was empowered to
exempt foreign issuers.68
The flow of foreign companies stopped, and more worryingly,
reversed. After the SEC relaxed standards for foreign companies
wanting to delist,69 a flood of companies headed for the doors.
70
London seized the opportunity; fourteen of the top twenty IPOs listed on
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) came from outside the United
Kingdom in 2005 to 2008. By contrast, only four of the top twenty IPOs
U.S.C.).
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A(m), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m) (2006).
62. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 101-109, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7219.
63. Id. § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
64. E.g., id. § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350.
65. Id. § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a).
66. Id. § 404(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b).
67. See Cyrus Afshar & Paul Rose, Capital Markets Competitiveness: A Survey of Recent
Reports, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 439, 449-51 (2007) (surveying studies of Sarbanes-Oxley
costs).
68. See generally Kenji Taneda, Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and the United States
Securities Regulation, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 715.
69. Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer's Registration of a Class of Securities Under Section
12(g) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-55540, 90 SEC Docket 860 (Mar. 27, 2007).
70. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVENESS MEASURES
(2009) (noting that 16% of foreign firms listed on the NYSE delisted in 2007); see also Craig Doidge et
al., Why Do Foreign Firms Leave US. Equity Markets? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14245, 2009) (finding that departing firms had lower growth prospects and capital
requirements).
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in New York came from outside the United States. 71 At the same time,
London's pool of liquidity was growing deeper, as it developed its own
community of hedge funds and private equity.
Still more ominously for New York, for the first time a small number
of U.S. companies chose to list their shares in London, instead of New
York.72 To be sure, most of the companies were not eligible for listing
on the Nasdaq, much less the NYSE. A quarter of the U.S. firms,
however, could have signed on to the Nasdaq, but instead opted for the
London AIM market. 73  London, long known for its "light touch"
regulation based on principles, took the next step with the AIM market.
The AIM market stood out for its minimal listing standards, essentially
requiring only a sponsoring institution-a NOMAD-to vouch for the
company. Even listing on the LSE was less burdensome than New
York; the LSE only required foreign issuers to comply with the
disclosure requirements of their home jurisdiction.75 London was
providing an unencumbered source of liquidity, instead of the bonding
opportunity provided in New York. London was winning the race, but
the contest suddenly looked like a race to the bottom.
These developments suggested that in the competition for
international listings, the United States may have repeated New Jersey's
misstep in the competition for corporate listings. Delaware did not start
out with the lead in the market for corporate charters. That honor
belonged to New Jersey, which was the first state to attract significant
numbers of corporate charters from companies located out of state. New
Jersey stole a march on New York, the more obvious location for
incorporation in the late nineteenth century, by adopting an "enabling"
model of corporate law that emphasized contractual freedom. 76  New
71. REVIEW OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF LONDON'S FINANCIAL CENTRE, LONDON: WINNING IN
A CHANGING WORLD 13, exhibit 3 (2008); see also Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, Regulation
and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings (Rock Ctr. For Corp.
Governance, Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 11, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=956987 (finding a shift in smaller firm listings post-Sarbanes-Oxley); Afshar &
Rose, supra note 67, at 457 (collecting data on decline of foreign companies listing in the U.S.).
72. See COMm. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 70 (noting that 20% of U.S. IPOs
were listed abroad in 2008).
73. Craig Doidge et al., supra note 47, at 263 (finding that approximately 25% of the U.S. firms
listing on AIM would qualify for Nasdaq.).
74. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES (2009), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/documents/aim-rules-for-
companies.pdf.
75. Kathryn Ceams & Eilis Ferran, Non-Enforcement Led Public Oversight of Financial and
Corporate Governance Disclosures and ofAuditors 34-35 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working
Paper No. 101/2008, 200*) (discussing regulation of European issuers in the United Kingdom).
76. Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race: Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise
and Decline of New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323,346 (2007).
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Jersey's reputation as a haven for incorporation eviscerated overnight,
however, by new laws pushed by Governor Woodrow Wilson in an
effort to crack down on business trusts. 7  Corporations quickly fled
south to Delaware, which had copied New Jersey's enabling approach,
but did not follow when New Jersey took a more restrictive turn.
78
Delaware grabbed the lead and never looked back. In the market for
corporate listings, the United States yielded its lead with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. Can the United Kingdom dominate the listing market the
way Delaware has dominated the charter market?
IV. Is LONDON DELAWARE?
Can London sustain its new momentum? The United Kingdom has a
number of characteristics that seem to mirror the factors responsible for
Delaware's comparative advantage. Certainly the financial services
industry is critical to the United Kingdom, growing from 5.3% of the
economy in 2001 to 9.4% in 2006, 79 and employing half a million
people in London alone. 80  From a regulatory perspective, the United
Kingdom's credible and responsive Financial Services Authority (FSA)
might be viewed as the securities law analogue to the Delaware
Chancery Court's role in corporate adjudication. The FSA's "light
touch" approach to regulation gives London a predictability edge over
New York, which is subject to the SEC's more intrusive (and expensive)
scrutiny. 81  London's unitary financial services regulator also reduces
compliance costs in the United Kingdom relative to those imposed by
the splintered regulatory structure in the United States, with its alphabet
soup of federal and state agencies regulating broker-dealers, banks and
insurers. 82
Key to Delaware's ability to maintain and extend its lead in corporate
77. Id. at 326-27.
78. Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 Del. J.
Corp. L. 249 (1976).
79. REVIEW OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF LONDON'S FINANCIAL CENTRE, supra note 71, at 13,
exhibit 4.
80. Id. at 14, exhibit 5.
81. BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 8, at 77 (reporting survey results of senior executives
indicating greater perceived predictability of legal regime in the United Kingdom). The United
Kingdom's "light touch" approach should not be confused with a "laissez faire" attitude. See Eilis
Ferran, Capital Market Competitiveness and Enforcement 6 (April 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1127245 (discussing recent enforcement actions
brought by the FSA).
82. BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 8, at 81 (2007). On the United Kingdom's transition
to a unitary financial services regulator, see Eilis Ferran, Examining the United Kingdom 's Experience
in Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. INT'L L.J. 257 (2003).
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charters has been the Delaware legislature's restraint. That body was
conspicuous in failing to succumb to the quest for populist retribution in
the wake of Enron and WorldCom. (To be sure, the demand for revenge
may have been mitigated by the fact that neither company was
incorporated in Delaware.) Less restraint was shown at the federal level
in the United States. By adopting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the U.S.
Congress demonstrated that it could not be trusted (at least in the eyes of
foreign executives and directors). As noted above, the flow of foreign
companies to New York largely dried up. By contrast, the British
Parliament largely stayed on the sidelines at that time. For its part, the
FSA pushed a set of "best practices" for corporate governance, backed
only by a disclosure requirement for firms that chose not to follow the
best practices directive. 83 That episode suggested that London would
follow the Delaware example, affording it a comparative advantage over
New York on the predictability front.
More recent events, however, suggest that the regulatory forces in
London cannot be so reliably constrained. Consequently, its recently
gained allure for listings may be more tenuous. Unlike Delaware, which
has a small population and few public companies' headquarters, the
United Kingdom, while benefiting from the financial services industry,
84
cannot completely insulate that industry from the political pressures
(pathologies?) typical of modem democracies. Britain has many public
companies headquartered there, and of greater current relevance, a
substantial representation of the world's largest banks. The response to
the near failure of a number of those banks in the wake of recent credit
crisis revealed that the British democratic process was not immune to
the inevitable quest for a scapegoat.
The British real estate market was infected by a bubble that paralleled
the one that fueled the U.S. economy from 2002 to 2007, and the
bubbles popped simultaneously. 85  Unlike 2002, when the British
response to the collapse of Enron and WorldCom was restrained, the
British response to the financial meltdown was conspicuously un-
Delaware-like. Indeed, the United Kingdom's actions closely paralleled
the populist backlash against the moneyed classes that emanated from
Washington.
86
83. See Cearns & Ferran, supra note 75, at 55-60 (discussing UK Combined Code on Corporate
Goverance); Afshar & Rose, supra note 67, at 461-63 (discussing "comply or explain" approach of the
United Kingdom and listing countries adopting that approach).
84. See Alistair MacDonald & Cassell Bryan-Low, Turmoil Batters London 's Status as Financial
Center, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2008, at A10 (citing government statistics that one in five jobs in the
United Kingdom were in financial services).
85. See id.
86. See Adam Nagoumey, Bracing for a Bailout Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,2009, at A14.
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The initial British response was just as muddled as the U.S. response.
As the markets declined in 2008, the FSA responded by banning short
selling for a long list of financial institutions. 87  This strategy of killing
the canary in the coal mine, lest it die from the poisonous gases, was
also pursued by the SEC, which also limited short selling in an effort to
keep the markets propped up. 88 The message for hedge funds and other
liquidity providers was clear: Regulators and politicians in both
Washington and London believed in the free play of market
forces ... until it became politically inexpedient. When the markets
started to go south, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic retreated
to the old time faith in government control, whether or not it was likely
to be effective. 89  (For the record, it was not; the markets continued to
plunge.)
As the credit crisis deepened, London, like was Washington, was also
forced to step in and bail out a number of leading financial institutions.
90
The messy insolvency of Northern Rock pressured the government into
adopting new legislation to ensure the orderly resolution of failing
banks.91 And like Washington, London quickly followed government
control with populist retribution. 92  Constituents were angry, and limits
on executive pay were imposed on executives of financial institutions
receiving bailouts on both sides of the Atlantic. 93 To be sure, no British
87. Alistair MacDonald, U.K. Plans To End Ban on Shorting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at C3.
88. See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58166,
93 SEC Docket 2122 (July 15, 2008); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Halts Short
Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets (Sept. 19, 2008); Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of
Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at Al; see also Jonathan Macey, The
Government Is Contributing to the Panic, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2003, at A13 (criticizing SEC's
restrictions on short sales).
89. On the role of short sellers in price discovery, see Jonathan M. Karpoff & Xiaoxia Lou, Do
Short Sellers Detect Overpriced Firms? Evidence from SEC Enforcement Actions (Sept. 6, 2008),
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/Karpoff 2008_paper.pdf (showing that short
sellers anticipate SEC enforcement actions); Ekkehart Boehmer et al., Which Shorts Are Informed? 63 J.
FiN. 491 (2008) (showing that heavy short sellers outperform the market).
90. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., U.K. Chiefs Repair Image With Bailout, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,
2008, at A3; Carrick Mollenkamp et al., U.K. Boosts Its Bailout As Bank Losses Rise, WALL ST. J., Jan.
20, 2009, at Al; Mark Landler, U.S. Investing $250 Billion in Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/business/economy/14treasury.html.
91. See Banking (Special Provisions) Act, 2008, c. 2 (U.K.).
92. See Sara Schaefer Mufioz, Public Flaying for U.K. Bank Titans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2009,
at C I; Letter from Andrew M. Cuomo, New York Att'y Gen., to Honorable Barney Frank, Chairman,
House Committee on Financial Services (February 10, 2009) (describing Cuomo's investigation into
payment of bonuses at Merrill Lynch after government sponsored merger with Bank of America).
93. See Alistair MacDonald & Sara Schaefer Mufioz, In U.K., Getting Tough With Nationalized
Banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at C3 (describing reduced bonuses imposed by U.K. Treasury);
Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, Stimulus Plan Places New Limits on Wall St. Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES.
Feb. 14, 2009, at Al.
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politician sunk to the level of Senator Charles Grassley, who
recommended ritual suicide for AIG derivatives traders who received
performance bonuses after the government bailed out the insurance
company. 94 (Never mind that the traders receiving the bonuses were not
the ones responsible for the losses. 95) But British bankers did come in
for vandalism of their homes and cars, not to mention bullying of their
children at school. 96 To its credit, the British government stood placidly
by while the U.S. Congress proposed a 90% tax rate on bonuses at
financial institutions receiving government assistance. But the
bureaucrats now in charge of the British banks cracked down in myriad
irksome ways, such as limiting the use of car services and requiring
employees to pay for their own meals on business trips.97 Trivial
matters perhaps, but for productive employees with alternative options,
it was another factor pushing them out the door.
The message on both sides of the Atlantic was clear. Regulators told
the public that their top priority was to free up lending markets. But
they sent a very different message to the bankers making the decisions
about whether to make loans: If you make risky loans that turn out
badly, we are going to slash your pay. And if you accept bailout money
to ameliorate the consequences of your risky lending, we may change
the rules of the game retroactively. 98  Not surprisingly, bankers who
94. Martin Kady, II, Grassley on AIG execs: Quit or suicide, POLITICO, Mar. 16, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/20083.html. The political witch hunt went hand-in-hand
with harassment in executives' private lives as well. Many felt compelled to hire private security. See
James Barron & Russ Buettner, Scorn Trails A.IG. Executives, Even in Their Driveways, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2009, at Al. The pressure for punitive taxation subsided after New York Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo bullied most of the recipients into paying back their bonuses. DealBook, A.LG. Memo
Hints at Pressure From Cuomo, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2009,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/aig-memo-points-to-pressure-from-cuomo/.
95. See Dear A.I.G., 1 Quit!, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at A29. Shockingly, the political
backlash pushed a number of the AIG managers out the door, increasing the cost of unwinding the
losing positions. Liam Pleven & Randall Smith, Action on AIG Unit May Cost Taxpayers, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 2009, at Cl.
96. Sara Schaefer Mufioz & Leila Abboud, In Europe, Rage Over Crisis Hits Executives, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at A7; Julia Werdigier & Matthew Saltmarsh, Hurt by Economy, Europeans Vent
Their Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at B I (reporting attacks on the property of the former CEO of
the Royal Bank of Scotland).
97. See Landon Thomas, Jr., British Bank Adapts to Life on a Leash, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009,
at B1.
98. David M. Herszenhom, To Chagrin of Republicans, Compensation Bill Passes, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2009, at B3 (describing bill that would allow Treasure Secretary to set compensation at firms
receiving bailout money); Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhom, House Approves 90% Tax on Bonuses
After Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at AI; Jonathan Weisman, Dodd's Amendment At Crux of
Bonus Issue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A4 (retroactive limits on bonuses eliminated from stimulus
bill because of constitutional doubts); Deborah Solomon & Mark Maremont, Bankers Face Strict New
Pay Cap, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009, at Al.
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were subject to the restrictions responded that they would repay the
governments' bailout funds ASAP. 99 Banks that had not accepted
money from the government loudly proclaimed that they would not be
lining up at the trough, 00 and that they would sell even strategically
important assets to avoid that fate.' 0 ' Credit markets tightened in
response, despite government efforts to jump-start them. 1
02
The governments' message to the small group of bankers that were
actually generating profits for the bailed-out banks was that they should
start looking for greener pastures at the healthier banks or at unregulated
entities. 10 3  In a situation in which the United Kingdom might have
distinguished itself by parting ways with the United States, it succumbed
to the populist backlash. 104 The CEO of the FSA warned that the
bankers to blame for the crisis should be "very frightened" of the FSA,
and more ominously, declared that "a principles-based approach does
not work with individuals who have no principles." 
105
99. DealBook, 4 Banks Become First to Repay TARP Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/4-banks-become-first-to-repay-tarp-money/; Andrew
Ross Sorkin, If Goldman Returns Aid, Will Others?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at BI; Stephen
Labaton, Some Banks, Feeling Chained, Want to Return Bailout Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at
AI; Kate Kelly & Robin Sidel, Aid Recipients Want To Give It Back Soon, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at
A10.
Notably, a number of institutions in the United States had to be bullied into taking the bailout
money in the first place. Mark Landler & Eric Dash, Drama Behind a Banking Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2008, at A 1 ("It was a take it or take it offer.").
100. See, e.g., Simon Nixon, Barclays Stresses Its Independence, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2009, at
B 10; Sara Schaefer Mufioz, Barclays Stays Firm: No Capital From U.K., WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2009, at
C3.
101. See Simon Nixon, For Barclays, Family Silver On the Block, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at
CI0 (discussing Barclays' plan to sell its iShares unit); see also Dana Cimilluca & Sara Schaefer
Mufioz, Barclays to Aid iShares Sale, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2009, at B3.
102. See David Enrich et al., Bank Lending Keeps Dropping, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2009, at Al
(reporting reduced lending by banks receiving bailout funds); Liz Rappaport & Jon Milsenrath,
Consumer-Loan Plan Is Off to Slow Start, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A2 ("Some investors are
concerned that they too could be exposed to a political storm should they make too much money from
the taxpayer-funded program.").
103. See Matthew Karnitschnig & Heidi N. Moore, Bankers Rush To the Exits, WALL ST. J., Mar.
1i, 2009, at CI (chronicling departures in both London and New York); see also DealBook, Citigroup
Eyes New Ways to Pay Employees, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/citigroup-eyes-new-ways-to-pay-employees/ (detailing
threat of employee defections from Citi's profitable energy trading business in response to limits on
pay).
104. See, e.g., Sara Schaefer Mufioz, Under Fire, a Top U.K. Watchdog Quits Post, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 12, 2009, at C3 (quoting John McCall, chairman of Parliamentary committee examining the
banking crisis, asking bank executives: "Why do you think you are hated so much by the public?").
105. Peter Thai Larsen & Jennifer Hughes, FSA to 'frighten' with tough stance, FIN. TIMES
(FT.cOM), Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2dbf2b7e-Oef8-llde-bal0-0000779fd2ac.html;
see also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities
Markets, 95 VA. L. REv. 1032-33 (2000) (predicting that FSA enforcement will become more stringent
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The contours of that frightening regulation came into sharper focus
with the FSA's publication of The Turner Review. 10 6 The Chancellor of
the Exchequer commissioned Lord Adair Turner, Chairman of the FSA,
to review the events that led to the financial crisis and to recommend
reforms.10 7  Most of the proposed reforms, such as increased capital
requirements, in particular for trading books, were predictable.'08 More
importantly, major banks were in no position to resist, given their
dependence on the promise of a government backstop.
But the focus on the need for capital requirements to be counter-
cyclical will be more difficult to implement simply as a technical
matter. 109 More controversial will be the proposal to limit pay structures
thought to create undue risk. 110 As a political matter, the proposal to
expand regulation to cover entities deemed part of the shadow banking
system will face the challenge of those entities fleeing offshore. 1"
Underlying all of these proposals is a newfound skepticism of the
efficiency of capital markets generally, and a distrust of the process of
securitization specifically. 112  Although understandable in light of the
dire circumstances that called for the review, does this new skepticism
augur a considerably more interventionist attitude going forward? At a
minimum, the report suggests that the United Kingdom will now be
more sympathetic to attempts to suppress regulatory competition if it
promises to limit risk taking. 113
If the United States and United Kingdom both responded to the credit
crisis in a heavy-handed way, is it a wash from a regulatory competition
perspective? Perhaps, in the short term, but the response does not bode
well for London's long-term future. This crackdown on financial
institutions creates the potential for bifurcating the financial sector into
two spheres. The first, populated by the type of institutions that have
populated the headlines during the ongoing credit crisis, consists of
as more retail investors enter the market).
106, FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL
BANKING CRISIS (2009).
107. See Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth., The FSA publishes "The Turner Review": a wide-
ranging review of global banking regulation (Mar. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/037.shtml.
108. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 106, at 53-60.
109. Seeid. at 61-67.
110. Seeid.at79-81.
111. Id. at 74 ("Tighter effective controls in offshore centers will, however, become more
important over time as regulation is improved in the major onshore locations and as the incentives for
regulatory arbitrage through movement offshore therefore increase.").
112. Id. at 39-42.
113. See Mark Whitehouse, 'Big Bang' Pioneers Rethink Banking Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Mar.
31, 2009, at A 1l.
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financial institutions that the government has deemed "too big to fail"
because their insolvency would threaten the functioning of the financial
system. Going forward, these institutions are likely to require the
backing of a lender of last resort to have credibility with counterparties.
If counterparties lose confidence in the ability of these financial
institutions to perform, these massive entities can evaporate virtually
overnight, as demonstrated by Lehman Brothers' demise. 114  The
registration of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as commercial banks
reflected their recognition of that market reality. 115  As the Turner
Review suggests, these large institutions are likely to face an array of
regulation, including considerably more stringent capital
requirements. " 6
The flip side of capital requirements, however, is the lower profits
implied by constraints on leverage. Leverage fueled the proprietary
trading that drove bank profits during the boom years."17  Smaller bets
will mean smaller paychecks. 18 Not satisfied with limiting leverage,
regulators may seek to limit pay directly for regulated institutions.' 19
Financial institutions are likely to tolerate this only if their business
model requires a very deep pocket as a backstop. And London's pocket
is unlikely to be deeper than New York's. Consequently, London's
policies are unlikely to be more lax than Washington's-indeed, they
may well be dictated by Washington. 120  If anything, London's
regulatory crackdown may be more draconian than the United States',
driven by new directives from the European Union. 121
114. See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Paulson, Bernanke Strained for Consensus in Bailout, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 10, 2008, at Al (chronicling the government's decision not to intervene to save Lehman Brothers).
115. Ben Protess, 'Flawed' SEC Program Failed to Rein in Investment Banks, PROPUBLICA, Oct.
1, 2008, http://www.propublica.org/article/flawed-sec-program-failed-to-rein-in-investment-banks- 101.
116. See Simon Nixon, U.K. 's Liquidity Rules May Drain Lending, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2008, at
BIO; Hugo Dixon, Separation Rule Is Not the Answer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, at B2 ("Tighter
regulation... should be the quid pro quo for being allowed to take deposits from the public or for being
too big to fail.").
More regulation is likely the best case scenario for these large institutions. The alternative is
to simply break them up. Maya Jackson Randall, Economists Seek Breakup Of Big Banks, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 22, 2009, at A2 (quoting Joseph Stiglitz: "We have little to lose, and much to gain, by breaking up
these behemoths, which are not just too big to fail, but also too big to save and too big to manage.").
117. See Joe Nocera, It's Not the Bonus Money. It's the Principle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at
BI.
118. See Robert Lenzner, Dimon, Munger, Rohatyn: No More Vegas, FORBES.COM, Oct. 13, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/l0/13/rohatyn-munger-dimon-pf-ii-in_rl_1 013croesusinl.html.
119. Landon Thomas, Jr., Regulators Worldwide Scrutinize Bakers' Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2009, B4 (discussing plan for regulators to control pay at financial institutions to limit risk taking).
120. Joe Nocera, Twins in Finance and Folly, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2009, at BI (arguing that
"Britain can't regulate unilaterally anymore-it is simply too dependent on American institutions. Its
regulatory response will be to mimic whatever the Obama administration decides to do.").
121. See REVIEW OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF LONDON'S FINANCIAL CENTRE,
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How do these developments in the financial services industry affect
the competition for listings? Strong banks-commercial and
investment-are one source of liquidity, but they do not dominate
trading in the financial markets as they once did. Moreover, as capital
requirements for such entities are ramped up, they will become even less
important as sources of liquidity because they will need to rein in their
proprietary trading. Traders have headed for the door rather than have
their pay restricted. 122 Where have they gone? To institutions that have
not yet felt the backlash of political retribution. Institutional investors,
such as pension funds, mutual funds, and increasingly, hedge funds,
have become the predominant sources of investment capital and trading
orders. London has become a leading center for such entities, rivaling
New York. 123 But is the status of those two finance capitals as centers
for institutional investors secure?
Tightened limits on leverage for institutions deemed "too big to fail"
create opportunities for smaller institutions, whose business models do
not require the backing of a lender of last resort. These entities will be
harder to regulate. Governments are keen to do so in the wake of the
financial crisis; politicians on both sides of the Atlantic put forward
proposals to crack down on hedge funds and other sources of capital that
have mushroomed in the last decade. 124  Among the more draconian
ideas, the FSA has proposed requiring the disclosure of short
positions.125 The FSA already requires disclosing positions greater than
3%, no matter the ownership form.126 The SEC responded with a
proposal to restore its largely ineffective "uptick" rule. 127 The Turner
supra note 71, at 17.
122. Caroline Salas & Pierre Paulden, Eat-What-You-Kill Bond Traders Rise From Wreckage,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601109&sid=al7vSRycD4TQ (discussing exodus of traders from large banks to boutique
firms).
123. BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 8, at 72 (noting 63% growth rate of hedge fund assets
in the United Kingdom from 2003-2005).
124. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Battles Over Reform Plan Lie Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2009, at BI (describing Obama administration proposal to regulate hedge funds); Jenny Strasburg,
Legislators Seek Hedge-Fund Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2009, at C2 (discussing proposed Hedge
Fund Transparency Act); Peter Lattman, Bill Aims for Disclosure by Private Equity, WALL ST. J., Feb.
4, 2009, at C3 (discussing application of proposed Hedge Fund Transparency Act to private equity);
David Cho, A Conversion in 'This Storm', WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2008, at Al; Cassell Bryan-Low, A
Blame Game For Bank Crisis, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, at C3 (discussing Parliamentary inquiry into
hedge fund practices).
125. Cassell Bryan-Low, U.K. Plan for Bears: Disclose All Bets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at C2
(discussing proposal to disclose all short positions of more than 0.5% of a company's shares).
126. Fin. Servs. Auth., Disclosure of Contracts for Difference, Policy Statement 09/3 (March
2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps0903.pdf.
127. DealBook, SEC Looks At More Short-Selling Measures, N.Y. TtsMS, Mar. 12, 2009,
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Review suggests more intrusive measures will be forthcoming, and the
EU is likely to push strongly in that direction. 1
28
That impulse to regulate hedge funds and private equity, however,
comes squarely up against the ever-increasing mobility of such
institutions. These institutions can do business in Greenwich or London,
but Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Dubai, Ireland, Luxembourg, and
Singapore, just to name a few, are also potential venues. 129  Smaller
countries, much like Delaware in the U.S. charter competition, are better
able to precommit to predictable regulatory structures because their
economies tend to be underdiversified.130  It is a safe bet that a number
of these jurisdictions will be happy to commit to a "principles-based"
regulatory approach now that the United Kingdom has announced a turn
toward a "frightening" regulatory approach. 3'
Regulators are in the business of regulating; naturally they want to
regulate as wide a domain as possible. The bifurcation between
financial institutions that are too big to fail, and therefore require a
government backstop, and those whose business models' allow greater
mobility, poses new challenges to regulators' domains. The end result
may be that regulators in the United States and United Kingdom wield
overarching authority over financial institutions that are dependent on
government bailouts (or may need such bailouts in the future). These
regulators wield such authority, however, at the risk that the regulatory
burden imposed will tend to shrink the sector being regulated. The
banks (and similar institutions) that are too big to fail will be closely
monitored; smaller financial institutions are likely to flee to more
permissive jurisdictions. Of course, the regulator's impulse will be to
suppress regulatory competition through international agreement on
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/sec-looks-at-more-short-selling-measures/. Newly
appointed SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro suggested that her agency needed more authority to regulate
hedge fund activities, including disclosure of short-sale positions, restricting leverage and investments.
Rachelle Younglai, SEC needs hedge fund authority: Schapiro, REUTERS, Apr. 29, 2009.
128. See Cassell Bryan-Low & Alistair MacDonald, EU Poised To Tighten Regulation, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 29, 2009, at C2; Laurence Fletcher & Simon Meads, Hedge Funds Attack EU Draft, REUTERS
UK, Apr. 23, 2009.
129. See Antony Currie & John Foley, Market Points to Banks in Need, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009,
at B2 ("Greenwich and Mayfair, the hedge fund capitals of the United States and Britain, may be
shrinking. But a new hedge fund center is sprouting in Hong Kong. More funds opened than closed in
the territory last year, according to the Alternative Investment Management Association."); see also
REVIEW OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF LONDON'S FINANCIAL CENTRE, supra note 71, at 21 (identifying
jurisdictions that pose particular threats to London).
130. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory
Competition 46-48 (Univ. of 111. Coll. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE07-032,
2008).
131. See Alistair MacDonald, U.K. Watchdog Adds More Bark, Bite, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at
C2 (describing greater scrutiny of financial institutions and bigger fines for violations).
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regulatory standards.' 3 2  That goal, however, faces immense collective
action problems, with many countries not inclined to follow the lead of
the United States and United Kingdom.' 
33
The flight of liquidity providers is one very real threat to London's
newfound ascendance in the market for listings. The other threat is
trading technology improvement; stock exchanges around the world now
offer similar speed in executing orders. Increasingly, securities trading
has been reduced to the status of commodity. The best trading systems
are no longer the monopoly of the exchanges, which are hemorrhaging
market share to proprietary trading systems and dark pools. 
134
Commodification of trading technology-along with greater access to
information about companies in other jurisdictions-has greatly reduced
the liquidity advantages formerly enjoyed by the LSE and NYSE, which
have cut fees in response.' 35  The value of the exchanges has
plummeted. 1
36
Of equal importance to the question of liquidity, companies no longer
need to bring their shares in physical proximity to investors.
Institutional investors, at least, can access virtually any market in the
world. 137 As a result, ADRs have fallen out of favor, as investors invest
directly abroad. 138  Moreover, Rule 144A allows issuers to access
capital in the United States without a U.S. listing. 139  Why should a
132. See Adam Bradbery & Alistair MacDonald, U.K. Puts Spotlight On Regulatory Gaps, WALL
ST. J., May 8, 2009, at C6; Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Signs of the Future of Banking and Finance
Emerge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2009, at A7; John W. Miller & Alistair MacDonald, EU to Push Global
Oversight of Top Financial Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2008, at A5.
133. See David E. Sanger & Mark Landler, Obama Faces Calls for Rules on Finances, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at Al; Alistair MacDonald & Joellen Perry, ECB, U.K. Spar on Bank Rules, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 13, 2009, at C8.
134. See, e.g., DealBook, NYSE Euronext Posts Big Loss on Write Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2009, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/l 0/nyse-euronext-posts-big-loss-on-write-down/;
David Bogoslaw, Big Traders Dive Into Dark Pools, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Oct. 3, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/oct2007/pi2007102-394204.htm. See generally Jerry
W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom The Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors
and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865 (2008).
135. Jacob Bunge, NYSE Adjusts Charges In Bid to Draw Traders, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at
C5 ("Incumbent stock exchanges are grappling with lower year-on-year trading volumes and tougher
competition from newer entrants like BATS Exchange and Direct Edge in the U.S., and a host of trading
platforms in Europe.").
136. See Greg Keller, NYSE Euronext swings to massive net loss in 4th quarter on $1.6B
writedown of merger goodwill, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Feb. 9, 2009 ("NYSE's matched
volume of NYSE-listed stocks fell to 43 percent during the fourth quarter, from 54.3 percent during the
year-ago period.").
137. Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1435, 1459-66 (2008).
138. See Pan, supra note 49, at 8-11.
139. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009). On the importance of Rule 144A in undermining the incentive
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company pay for an expensive listing in London or New York if a listing
in their home country allows them easy access to capital from around the
world?140 For regulators, this means that listing requirements are likely
to offer little leverage as a regulatory tool.141
In sum, I argue that the international market for listings parallels the
structure of the domestic market for corporate charters, but Delaware's
sustained ability to dominate that domestic market is not likely to be
replicated in the market for listings. Companies face a largely bilateral
choice between their home jurisdiction and the market leader. In
corporate law, Delaware has been that market leader since it surpassed
New Jersey; in listings, New York has been that market leader, but its
dominance was undermined when Congress and the SEC had their "New
Jersey moment" with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. New York's status is
now challenged, and perhaps, surpassed by London. But neither New
York nor London is likely to provide any important listing advantage
over a company's home jurisdiction in the long run. Both jurisdictions'
actions during the credit crisis revealed that they are willing to impose
regulatory burdens in the face of political pressure. In their home
jurisdiction, companies can at least bring political pressure to bear as a
counter to political retribution. 142  In the United States and United
Kingdom, foreign companies are essentially powerless in political
circles. London has not succumbed to the "bum the witches" mentality
seen in Washington of late, but it nonetheless lacks the credibility to
insulate companies from political influences in the way that Delaware
does.
V. CONCLUSION
Delaware has long enjoyed an overwhelming lead in the domestic
market for corporate charters, which invites the question of whether a
similar leader might emerge in the market for corporate listings.
Applying the insights derived from the market for corporate charters to
of foreign issuers to list in the U.S., see Pan, supra note 49, at 7. See also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The
Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 409 (2008).
140. See Alistair MacDonald & Cassell Bryan-Low, Turmoil Batters London's Status as Financial
Center, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2008, at AI0 ("The London Stock Exchange has seen international listings
fall by more than 70% in terms of capitalization year to date ... more emerging-market companies are
listing at home as these markets develop financial centers capable of handling larger listings.").
141. See Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition 12
(Georgetown Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 1313133, 2008) ("I suspect that if global fragmentation
becomes the norm, the concept of stock exchange 'listings' as a basis for jurisdiction and regulation of
issuers will weaken, and eventually disappear.").
142. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531 (2001).
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the market for listings, this Article has assessed the prospects of the two
leading contenders in the latter market, New York and London.
For London to dominate in the market for listings as Delaware has
done in the market for charters, it needs to offer a product that
companies' home jurisdictions cannot easily duplicate. The notion that
the world has become smaller is a clich&, of course, but it is nonetheless
an important insight for the market for corporate listings. The world of
investment capital shrinks every day, as institutional investors become
more willing to look beyond their home jurisdictions in search of
profitable investment opportunities. The lure of New York and London,
and the pools of liquidity that they offer, have diminished greatly in the
last decade, as trading has increasingly become a commodity. London
must look elsewhere to find a comparative advantage.
London bears at least superficial resemblance to Delaware-the
smaller, less populous competitor, heavily dependent on the financial
services industry-but its recent track record shows that it is susceptible
to political retribution in the same way that New York is. Democracy
has its virtues, but it also has its costs. Delaware's primary product is
predictability, which it has promoted by insulating its corporate law
from the ebb and flow of politics. London may dominate New York
with respect to predictability, but it does not appear to offer substantially
more certainty than companies can get in their home jurisdiction. The
answer to the cryptic question of my title, "London as Delaware?" is
'No."
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